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The Internet: Place, Property, or

Thing-All or None of the Above?
October 30, 2003

Morning Session
PROFESSOR MILANI: Welcome to the Mercer Law Review symposium on "The Internet: Place, Property, or Thing-All or None of the
Above?" My name is Adam Milani. I am a professor here, and I have
the pleasure of serving as the moderator of our first panel. Before I do
that, though, I want to thank a few people who were instrumental in
putting this together. First and foremost, we have to thank the person
who brought the whole idea together, and that is the Lead Articles
Editor for the Mercer Law Review, Ms. Elizabeth Wilson. Last spring
Liz spoke to Professor Dick Creswell and me about some ideas for the
symposium for this year. We talked for a few minutes about some
possible topics.
Professor Creswell is the one who deserves the credit for coming up
with the idea about the Internet. He had been reading recently about
the problems created by spam and by people invading other people's
websites, and he said that would seem to be an interesting topic for a
Law Review symposium. And I agreed.
We were fortunate enough to talk to Professor David Hricik, who has
some expertise in the area from his prior practice. I had some knowledge from my work in disability law that the question of access to
Internet sites was becoming a big issue under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA)1 as well as under Title II of the Civil Rights

1.

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
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Act.2 What we quickly determined was that both issues-the problem
of spamming and invading of websites and the problem of accessibility
to the websites-involved the same basic issue. What is the Internet?
Is it a place?
So Liz took it and ran with it, and she ran a long way with the help
of several people who I would also like to thank. First of all, David
Hricik, who did quite a bit of work on this; Professor Hal Lewis, who is
the faculty advisor for the Law Review; and of course, Yonna Shaw, who
is the rock of the Law Review and takes care of everything Law Review
related.
Now for a brief introduction on what our symposium is about. As
somebody who teaches writing in addition to some other things, what I
tell my students is what I am sure all law professors tell their students:
Law is about language. The language we use is vitally important. So
let's talk about some of the language we use when we talk about the
Internet.
We visit a website.
We meet people in a chat room.
We ask people for their E-mail address.
To keep unwanted visitors from damaging our systems or sending us
unsolicited E-mail, we build fire walls.
All of those things sound like places: site, room, walls, and addresses.
My colleague, Michael Smith, has written a new book, Advanced Legal
Writing: Theories and Strategies in Persuasive Writing,' which I highly
recommend to you. In it, he writes that "metaphor is regarded by many
classical rhetoricians as 'the most beautiful rhetorical figure,' the
'supreme ornament' of prose."4 And if law were based solely on
metaphor, there would be little doubt that the Internet is a place. It is
real and tangible property.
But metaphors aren't the law, and courts are now beginning to
address the key and very unsettled questions about the fundamental
nature of the Internet. The most basic issues are: Is a website real or
personal property? Is a website a place of public accommodation under
the ADA or Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? Courts are just now
deciding these issues for the first time.
How we characterize the various aspects of the Internet in terms of
property matters greatly. If a hacker or a spammer has trespassed onto

2.

Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (2000).
See generally MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES AND
STRATEGIES IN PERSUASIVE WRITING (2002).
4. Id. at 179 (quoting 3 Marius Fabius Quintilianus, Institutio Oratoria 199 (H.E.
Butler trans. 1954)).
3.
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real property, the network owner does not have to show actual damage
to get an injunction. "You came on my land. That is all I need to
prove." On the other hand, if the trespass is viewed as being on
personal property, then the owner can obtain an injunction only if the
spammer or hacker has somehow caused damage or is threatening to
cause irreparable injuries.
Similarly, if a website is a "place of public accommodation" for
purposes of the ADA, then the site owners must accommodate people
with disabilities. For example, they must make sure that their text is
compatible with screen readers so that people with visual impairments
can have access to the website. If the website is not a "place," however,
then the ADA does not apply, and no accommodation need be made.
What we have here is two different settings where the question is: "Is
it a place, is it property?" The dilemma that the panels will address
today is that, in the one setting, the owner of the website wants it to be
real property. When the hacker or spammer invades their space, the
owners want it to be real property so that they can have an easy route
to prevent the hacker or spammer from coming back. "You have invaded
my real property, and I don't have to prove damages. I get an injunction." It's good for the website owners if it is a "place" in that setting.
On the other hand, if the Internet is a "place," the website owner has
obligations under the ADA. Such obligations might be costly, depending
on who you talk to. So, in that setting, they would prefer that it not be
a place.
So what's the answer? The answer, of course, to each of these
questions, whether the Internet is place, property, thing, all or none of
the above, will affect commerce, privacy, and other key issues for years
to come. The Mercer Law Review Symposium has brought people
together from across the country to try to answer the question: What is
the Internet? Together with leading academicians, frontline litigators
and in-house counsel, who are all struggling with these issues, we will
examine the basic questions of the Internet as a property or place.
Our first panel is on the issue of whether the Internet is a place for
purposes of the ADA. If you have your program, first let me tell you
that there has been a switch in the order. Our first presenter is Henry
Timothy Willis, or Tim Willis, for those who are familiar with him.
Richard Moberly will be next; and Robin Adams Anderson will speak
last on this first issue.
Before they begin, I will do a brief introduction for each speaker,
starting with Robin. Robin is a member, a principal, in the firm of
Nicholls & Crampton, in Raleigh, North Carolina. Her primary area of
practice involves personnel counseling and representing people in
employment disputes, including discrimination cases involving age, race,

870
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disability, equal pay, and sexual harassment. One thing that is
interesting about Robin is that she represents both plaintiffs and
defendants in employment cases, which is very unusual. Usually you get
to do one or the other, but she represents both. She graduated from the
University of Massachusetts with a Bachelor of Arts. She has a law
degree from the University of North Carolina, where she was a member
of the Order of the Barristers.
Richard Moberly, seated next to Robin, is an associate with the firm
of McKenna, Long & Aldridge in Atlanta. He focuses primarily on
employment litigation and also does complex commercial litigation. He
primarily represents employers in ADA issues and also works with
statutes such as ERISA5 and the Family and Medical Leave Act.6
Richard is a graduate of Emory University as well as the Harvard Law
School, where he was an editor on the Harvard Law Review.
Finally, Tim Willis. Tim is a sole practitioner in his hometown of
Tucker, Georgia, and does work for small businesses and has a
substantial practice representing plaintiffs in disability discrimination
cases, including disability access cases involving the Internet. Tim, as
some of you may know, is also an accomplished athlete. He has
represented the United States in the Paralympics in both the 1996
Games in Atlanta as well as the 2000 Games in Sydney. He is a
graduate of Georgia Southern University and, most importantly, of the
Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law, where he graduated
in 2000.
We welcome all of them, and we will start with Tim.
MR. WILLIS: Good morning.
AUDIENCE: Good morning.
MR. WILLIS: It is quite a pleasure to come out here to speak with all
of you about what is in fact a very important topic within the community
of people with disabilities and people who represent people with
disabilities. I never had any idea this very issue of interpreting the ADA
to be a place when talking about websites and Internet accessibility and
so forth was such a big issue until about a little more than a year ago.
I was plaintiff's counsel in a case against the Metro Atlanta Rapid
Transit Authority, which is MARTA up in Atlanta for those who are not
familiar with the State of Georgia [Martin v. MetropolitanAtlanta Rapid

5.
6.

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2003).
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2003).
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Transit Authority].' One of our allegations in the complaint was that
the website was inaccessible and denied people using certain kinds of
technology the ability to access information from the MARTA website.
In the judge's thirty page decision we. got about twenty-four words that
said that until MARTA fixes its website, it is violating the ADA under
Title II, Title II being public entities.
Well the rest of the case dealt with much more and covered more
immediate and important issues, but it was those brief words this judge
put in that case that resulted in all four attorneys working on this case
getting numerous phone calls for a period of several weeks because that
was the first time a judge had stated that, and it was a published
opinion.
So it is a big issue. And it is something that the courts have to deal
with and struggle with. It is something that companies are going to
have to deal with and it is something that attorneys will have to deal
with when presenting arguments to courts.
Let me start off and touch on a little bit of what Professor Milani
pointed out just a few minutes ago and that is the whole matter under
the ADA, a threshold issue. For those who do not know, under every
statute there is always a series of questions and tests that have to be
met before you even get into the factual situation that is occurring. If
you find under the ADA, Title III, that something is not a place, then
the ADA does not apply. So no matter what is occurring with the socalled place, non-place, or non-physical space, it will not matter if the
court finds the ADA does not cover it. Therefore what happens is your
case gets thrown out of court. There has been one decision in that
context, which I will talk about briefly, that did exactly that. Fortunately, in the case I was involved in that did not happen on that particular
issue.
But when we look at the threshold issue, it is important to look at two
things. First, what is the plain language of the statute? What does the
statute say? What are the enumerated things in the statute that are
covered by the ADA? Second, look at the purpose. What is the purpose
of the ADA? Why is the ADA what it is? Why is it there? Why did
Congress draft such a lengthy statute thirteen years ago? What was it
all about?
I think that when looking at the language, you always have to keep
in mind and go a step further and look at the purpose. It is important
to look at the purpose from the standpoint of what is the negative
consequence that can occur in either direction and whether the court

7.

225 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2002).
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finds that something is a place or not a place. Is this going to end up
costing companies lots and lots of money, or is this going to end up
allowing or disallowing people with certain sorts of disabilities the
ability to access goods and services that are provided on the Internet?
And after I have sat here and said Web accessibility probably a dozen
times now and you keep seeing the phrase, many people are probably
mystified as to what it means. What exactly does it mean? Well it
means that when a person has certain kinds of disabilities, whether it
is visual impairment or some sort of orthopaedic impairment with his
hands, he has to use specialized software to access a computer. The
computer would be no different than a computer in this law school,
except it runs an extra piece of software in the background that allows
text on a screen to be magnified. It allows text on a screen to be spoken
in words. Or it allows someone to use a specialized keyboard to input
data. An inaccessible website prevents this kind of specialized software
from being used.
So when someone takes one of these pieces of software and loads up
a particular website, if the website is inaccessible, then the person using
that software or particular device is unable to access any of the
information on that site, whether it is booking hotel rooms or airline
flights, or just getting general information about the company.
So that is what we are talking about when we talk about accessible
websites. We all know what we mean when we say an accessible
building. An accessible building is a building that has certain architectural barriers removed so that people with various impairments can
access the building. An example would be having a ramp on a store
front or an elevator in a multiple floor building. It took many years for
architects to grasp those concepts, and now because of the ADA and
other laws, multiple story buildings are not built without elevators.
They are built with ramps in front of them.
So that is the kind of mindset that Web accessibility and people
looking at Web accessibility have to follow. What is it in the architecture of that website that is going to enable people using specialized
software to access the same information as anybody else? And with the
advances in society and the enhancements of this specialized software,
it is becoming more and more crucial that people with disabilities have
that same access to utilize the goods and services on websites. There are
very few things anymore in today's society that cannot be done on the
Web. People, I think I even saw that you can earn a Ph.D. on the Web
now. You can do just about anything. Without the ability to use the
Web, you miss out on a lot of things in our society.
Today we are focusing on Title III of the ADA, which covers private
entities. Entities such as travel services, hotels, bakeries, recreation
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areas, auditoriums, movie theaters, and so forth. The ADA enumerates
roughly twelve categories, which are fairly broad, and many things can
fall up under them. In the Southern District of Florida in the past year,
in fact roughly a week after the MARTA case, the Southern District of
Florida had a case against Southwest Airlines about its accessible
website [Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co.].8
We all know that all airlines have websites, and that is how most
people book their travel reservations. They do this for a couple of
reasons. It is usually quicker; they can shop around and browse around;
and it is cheaper. At times you can get as much as a thirty to forty
percent discount on plane tickets purchased on the Web, discounts not
accessible by calling the airline or walking into the ticket office. Just
think the last time you called an airline and you got some sort of
outrageous rate and the person on the phone said, "Well, you might want
to check the Web; you might can find something cheaper." So if you are
on the phone, and you could not access that particular rate through the
telephone or through the website, you would be shut out of getting that
discounted fare.
Well the court in Florida said that Southwest Airlines's website was
not a covered entity under the ADA, therefore throwing out the
plaintiff's complaint in that lawsuit. And the court found on two
grounds why the website was not a place under the ADA. Number one
was essentially the plain language of the statute. I am not sure if the
judge was expecting the words "Southwest" to be included in the ADA
or was expecting the Internet to be included in the ADA, but keep in
mind the ADA was passed in 1990, thirteen years ago. I did not know
what the Internet was in 1990, and I do not think too many people in
here probably knew either what the Internet was. So the one thing that
is in the plain language of the statute, which is being argued on appeal,
is travel service. Southwest Airlines operates a travel service, and a
travel service as you can imagine is something that you utilize to book
rates, book fares, airplanes, rental cars, hotels, and the like. Well the
court did not agree with any of those concepts and said it is not in the
plain language of the statute, therefore it is not covered under the ADA.
The court also went a step farther and said that this website does not
have a "nexus" to a place under the ADA. A nexus meaning it is not the
means by which you access a place. Now if you look at the enumerated
things under the ADA, an airline or an aircraft is not mentioned. A
travel service is mentioned. Airlines are not mentioned because there
are other laws that cover them when it comes to disability issues;

8.

227 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
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therefore, it is not included in the ADA. So the judge felt that since the
terms airline and aircraft are not in there, it is not a nexus to that place.
But of course the plaintiff's contention was that the travel service is the
place that is listed, therefore there is a nexus.
And where the judge got this whole concept of nexus from was a case
that I think is probably the most similar to this same issue and that is
Rendon v. Valleycrest Products,Ltd.,' which the Eleventh Circuit ruled
on about maybe a year and a half ago. Rendon was a case in which a
group of deaf individuals brought a lawsuit against the "Who Wants To
Be A Millionaire" show, and I believe the company that owns that was
Valley Crest but everybody knows it as the "Who Wants To Be A
Millionaire" show. The reason for bringing the lawsuit was because the
dial-in hotline to become a contestant was inaccessible to people with
hearing impairments. People with hearing impairments could not utilize
their technology with their telephones to bid to be on the actual show.
And therefore when the case went to the Eleventh Circuit, the Eleventh
Circuit said that the broadcast studio is a place under the ADA and the
1-800 hotline is the means by which people access that particular studio.
That is how they become a contestant. They were being denied that
ability by them not making accommodations with their particular 1-800
number.
So when we go back and look at what the court is going to look at,
particularly in the Eleventh Circuit case, which is going to be heard in
about two weeks down in Miami, Florida, I think, at least in my opinion,
that people should concentrate on: Does the entity being sued operate
a place under the ADA? And there's a lot of case law out there. In fact
I was informed last night by Professor Milani that his second year
students' appellate brief this year is on that particular issue. But does
the entity actually operate a place that falls under the ADA? And if so,
how does that entity operate that place?
When we start looking at how that entity operates that particular
place, whatever it may be, whether it is the website or whatever, it is
always important to look at some of the results that are occurring on the
website. Under the ADA you are required to make certain accommodations for what are called auxiliary aids, making sure that people needing
certain assistance for certain things in a setting, a place setting, should
have the ability to access the same things, whatever they may be. A
good example would be if you have ever been to the Fox Theater for a
play in recent years. Usually you will see a sign language interpreter
up in the front signing. Or at least you probably see it at major sporting

9.

294 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2002).
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events and so forth. That is the way an entity is providing an auxiliary
aid to provide the same sort of communications to persons with that
particular disability.
The next thing to look at when we start talking about the access to the
place is: Does the criteria and the method by which the entity is using
this website tend to screen out people with disabilities just strictly by
the policies and procedures that are in place? Well an inaccessible
website that cannot be accessed by people with visual impairments using
specialized software will screen those people out. So a visually impaired
person using a particular type of software who goes onto that website is
screened out from using it. The ADA under Title III clearly bars that
sort of activity.
We should also look at whether or not the person's ability to participate and receive the benefits and privileges from a particular entity are
being denied. Whether the website is actually giving better rates to
people that can access that website than those that cannot access it.
I am a big believer that there should be a broad reading of this
statute. The purpose of the ADA is to eliminate discrimination and to
expedite inclusion of people with disabilities. The Rendon decision in
the Eleventh Circuit also stressed the significance of communication
barriers and how the ADA was clearly put in place to break down some
of the communication barriers. Those things that are occurring on an
inaccessible website are definitely erecting communication barriers to
people trying to access them.
Also the ability to access any of the other goods and services that an
entity might have on their website is important. It is not only the
product that the entity is selling, but there are also things that people
can join up on and benefit from in a website setting.
And finally I think it is important to remember that because of today's
society, it is easy to make a website accessible. It is readily achievable.
The people that are arguing in favor of this are not asking for something
that's never been done before. They are not asking for a kind of
technology that is not out there. It all goes back to the mindset of the
developers and the architects of websites. It is readily achievable in
today's society and I think very few entities would have a good defense
that it is an undue burden, or it is something that cannot be done,
technologically infeasible, as some have said.
So this is something that is in the courts now and will be in the courts
probably for a good while. It is my contention and belief that private
entities should step up to the plate and make changes. There was one
case filed about five years ago against AOL on this same issue, and AOL
decided to try to, in my opinion, do the right thing. They agreed in a
settlement agreement to fix certain things on their computer software
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and their Internet sites that would enable people with visual impairments to use those easier [Noah v. AOL Time Warner,Inc.].1" In many
respects it is a good business decision because there are many millions
of people who use this specialized kind of technology, and when you shut
them out, they are not able to access the same things.
So that is all I am going to say for now. I am going to turn it over to
the next speaker, and we will have some questions at the end of our
panel. Thank you very much.
MR. MOBERLY: Thank you, Tim, for providing that overview. One
of the things that I think Tim mentioned and that is important for all
of us to keep in mind is that the ADA was passed in 1990. As Tim said,
the Internet was merely a glimmer in the eye of most people, and so it
was definitely not on Congress's mind. I think everyone can agree that
Congress did not anticipate the advancement of the Internet. So I think
when we talk about this question, part of it is statutory interpretation
and part of it is figuring out how we are going to apply statutes and
laws to new technology that develops. There are a number of different
ways you can look at it.
There are two extremes in this regard. I do not mean that to be a
critical term. I mean that they are at either end of the spectrum. One
extreme is that the ADA does not apply to Internet websites. It would
not apply at all to any Internet website because the ADA, according to
this view, requires a physical place. And as Tim mentioned, that was
the view taken by the court in Southwest, the one that is on appeal, and
Internet websites according to this court are not physical places.
The other end of the spectrum is articulated by a number of advocates
for individuals with disabilities, including the National Council on
Disabilities, which is an independent federal agency that advises the
President and Congress on disability issues. These advocates have come
out and said, you know, we need to reconceptualize our idea of place.
The Internet has become such an important part of the economics of this
country and of our society that in order to advance the purpose, much
as Tim said, of the ADA, to incorporate individuals with disabilities into
our society fully, we need to apply the statute to Internet websites in
general, all Internet websites.
The position I take on this matter is somewhere in the middle and it
is utilizing the approach used in Rendon, which is the "nexus" approach.
Under the "nexus" approach, the ADA would apply to some, but not all,
websites, based upon whether the website was connected to a physical

10.

261 F. Supp. 2d 532 (E.D. Va. 2003).
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place of public accommodation. In Rendon, the Eleventh Circuit looked
at an intangible barrier to access, something you could not physically
touch, this telephone hotline. Now the defense asserted that the
telephone hotline is not physically a place. The Eleventh Circuit looked
beyond that and said, no, but it has a connection to a physical place.
And that connection means that it needs to be accessible to individuals
with disabilities.
I would argue that that same test needs to be used in this context to
apply the ADA to some but not all Internet websites. It would apply to
some Internet websites, for example the websites that have a connection
to a physical place, such as Barnes and Nobles, the book store, which
has a physical place you can enter. A physical place communicates with
people and permits access to its goods and services through its website,
and, therefore, the website ought to be accessible.
Amazon.com, another book seller, does not operate a physical place.
Its website under this approach would not need to be accessible under
the ADA. So there is some distinction there. We can talk about that.
And as I told Professor Milani when I was talking to him about my
theory of this three or four months ago, I said, "Well, gosh, both sides of
the extreme will be able to find something that they like about my
approach." And he informed me, "Well, actually you're going to get
attacked from both sides and neither side is going to like you because
they're not getting everything they want." So I am prepared for that,
and we will talk about that issue.
But there are essentially three different reasons why I think this
approach is the best approach of all these three alternatives. The first
reason is it best reflects the statutory language. I handed out, and I do
not know if all of you have it, it is at the end of each row, but I went
ahead and typed out the statutory language that we are talking about,
because as Tim said the first thing any court is going to do when they
are looking at this issue is to delve into the language of the statute.
The first term you have to look at are the definitions of public
accommodations. As Tim said there are twelve different types of places
mentioned once you affect commerce. Any of you who have taken
constitutional law know that to affect commerce, although it has been
narrowed recently, is a relatively broad concept. Merely by walking out
this door, you probably affect commerce in some sense. And as you look
through this list what you see are physical places. You see inns and
hotels, restaurants, motion picture houses, auditoriums, bakeries, barber
shops, places that you can physically enter, that people physically access.
Courts such as the court in Southwest and the court in an unpublished
opinion, and in other types of intangible areas have looked at this
language and said, you know, we are going to require a physical place.
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And the court in Southwest said that airline websites are not physical
places. Courts have held that insurance policies, membership organizations, and newspaper articles are not physical places. All of those places
have been found not to be physical places, and therefore they are not
places of public accommodation. Courts reached this conclusion through
two canons of statutory construction. For those of you who are taking
a statutory construction class, we will delve into this just a little bit.
The first is a canon called noscitur a sociis, and what that means
essentially is that you judge a person by the people they surround
themselves with. The people who argue for a broad application of the
ADA to the Internet will look at terms such as travel service in (f) and
public display in (h), and much like the plaintiff in Southwest will say,
you know, we are a travel service. That ought to be read very broadly.
Well what that canon of statutory construction says is, when you have
a broad and ambiguous term like travel service, you interpret that term
by looking at the other words that surround it. So for travel service, for
instance, you are looking at a beauty shop or a barber shop, a shoe
repair service, an insurance office, or the office of an accountant or
lawyer. All of those are physical places, much as with public display
which is near the terms "museum" or a "gallery." And so you would
interpret those types of travel service places not as broadly as the
plaintiff would want you to in Southwest but as physical places.
The other argument used in Southwest, was that, we will look at these
broad kind of catch-all terms at the end of the sections: Other places of
exhibit, exhibition or entertainment; and other service establishments.
We ought to be one of those other places. Another canon is called
ejusdem generis. This canon means that when you have broad catch-all
terms, you interpret them in light of the terms that come in front of
them. And this is, quite simply, a way that we can reduce the scope of
acts of Congress so that we make sure that we are covering only what
Congress wanted us to cover. And so you would look again back to the
physical places. That argument has been used in other types of contexts,
as I mentioned before.
Under the nexus approach, you accept the premise that the ADA must
apply to a physical place because we are going to read the statute
narrowly. That reading is reinforced by the language of the regulations.
The ADA does not actually define a place of public accommodation, it
defines "public accommodations."' A "place of public accommodation"
is defined in the regulations as a "facility operated by a private entity
who falls in one of [these twelve] categories." 12 The regulations then

11. American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2000).
12. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2002).

2004]

MORNING SESSION

879

define "facility" in very physical terms: "Any portion of buildings or
structures or sites or complexes."" So I think there is statutory and
regulatory support for reading that provision very narrowly.
But here is where the judge, I think, in the Southwest Airlines case
did not go far enough. Once you realize that a place of public accommodation is a covered entity under the ADA, such places have very broad
antidiscrimination responsibilities. So a relatively narrow application
to a specific group of covered entities leads to a very broad antidiscrimination prohibition.
There is a very general prohibition under the ADA: "No individual
shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages
or accommodations." 4 That is a very broad list of prohibitions. And
what the court in Southwest Airlines wanted to do is say, you know,
what we are really talking about with that is just physical access. As
Tim mentioned, typically this statute has been used to require building
ramps for people in wheelchairs and other physical changes. But the
court in Rendon says, no, it is not just physical access, it is also
intangible access, any way you access your goods or your services. Once
you are a covered entity, you have to provide equal enjoyment of your
goods, services, etc. So therefore, under the nexus approach, if you are
a physical place of public accommodation and you give access to your
goods and services through your website or you communicate through
your website, then you would fall under this general prohibition on
discrimination by not having your website accessible.
Tim mentioned several of the specific provisions that are also listed,
such as a failure to make a reasonable modification and failure to
provide an auxiliary service or aid, such as a Braille reader. I think it
is a pretty reasonable interpretation of that statute to say that once you
are a covered entity, if you do not provide an auxiliary aid by changing
the way your website is accessed, then that is going to be discrimination
under the ADA. But that should not be applied in general to Internet
websites across the board because a lot of Internet websites do not have
a connection, they do not have a nexus, to a physical place.
The second reason that I think this nexus idea works is that it
accurately reflects better than the other two approaches what we really
use the Internet for today. Under the ADA there is a distinction
between providing access to a place's goods and services and making
that place change the content of its goods and services. The ADA
requires the former but not the latter.
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An example in the regulations is of a book store. If a visually
impaired person wants to access your book store, you have to let them
in. You have to sell them books, just like you would anybody else. But
what you do not have to do is stock Braille books for them to read unless
they ask you specifically. So there is this distinction between access and
content.
Under the nexus approach, when you are looking at the Internet, the
unique thing about the Internet is that it is really both, isn't it? It
provides access to goods, but for a lot of places it is also the actual
content of the website. And if you apply the ADA too generally to the
Internet then a place like Yahoo! or eBay or Map Quest is going to say,
"I shouldn't have to change my website because then I'm changing the
content of my good or service because the content that I provide is the
website." If you apply it too narrowly and do not apply it to any website
whatsoever, then you will not be able to utilize the access function, that
the ADA will not be providing access to a certain thing.
What the nexus approach does is draw a very rough line between
Internet sites that are connected to physical places and ones that are
not. What that line does, I would posit to you, is recognize that a
physical place is more likely to have a good or service that is not on its
website. It is more likely that a physical place of public accommodation
is going to use its website in a way to allow access to its goods and
services and to communicate, and that is precisely what the ADA
requires of physical places, equal access. However, it is more likely that
an Internet only website is going to be the content of the goods or
services it provides. Under the nexus approach, by not applying
generally to those websites, we can avoid the debate over whether a
website will be required to change its content, which the ADA does not
allow.
The third rationale for the nexus approach is that it leads to a better
policy result. On matters such as this, Congress ought to decide how to
apply statutory requirements to new technologies. This is a congressional function.
The important thing to remember is that when Congress wants to
speak on technology issues, it does so very specifically. In fact, in Title
IV of the ADA is an entire section related to the telecommunications
industry and the requirements to have a Telecommunications Device for
the Deaf (TDD) display. There are all sorts of regulations set up, but
Congress separated that part out and spoke to that very specifically.
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Eight years after the passage of the ADA, Congress amended the
Rehabilitation Act,1 5 the predecesser to the ADA. The Rehabilitation
Act applies the same antidiscrimination issues to the federal government
but only to the federal government. The ADA was passed to expand
those prohibitions to private entities.
In 1998 Congress amended Section 508 of that Act to specifically
require federal agencies to make their Internet websites accessible. I
would argue by doing that, Congress implicitly had the opportunity to
change the ADA and make it specific to apply across the board to
Internet websites, and it did not do it. I think those two things show a
congressional intent that they are going to wait on this. They are going
to see how the Internet develops, and how that technology develops. Our
elected bodies are there to balance the needs of individuals with
disabilities with the burdens that would be placed on the business
community, and at this point they have not decided to do anything about
that. And I think we ought to wait until Congress wants to speak to
that issue specifically.
There are two other policy reasons why I think this nexus approach
works. First, as a jurisdictional matter it makes it much easier to apply
the ADA because it will be grounded in a physical entity that we know
is going to be located in the United States. We can then attach onto this
physical entity; we can sue it, and we can get it into court. I am sure we
will talk about what it takes to get into a court under the ADA later.
But that physical place will make it much easier for us to bring suit
under the ADA than if it applies to the Internet generally. Who knows
where the Internet website is going to be located? How are you going to
figure out what server is going to be accessed? Is it just merely going
through an American server? Is that enough to get personal jurisdiction? Those issues I think you would avoid under the nexus approach
because you'd be grounded in the physical requirement.
And finally, I think this requirement again is a middle ground
approach that would allow us to have experience with this requirement
before we burden an entire industry with this requirement. To allow
Congress to take a look at, okay, here are places of public accommodation that are making their website available. How much is it actually
costing them? How much of a burden is it really? And is that enough
of a burden that we want to put on them? Is it important enough to
make all websites accessible if we're going to change the law to make it
apply to everybody? So it provides a test run to see if this would work
or not.
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For all those reasons I think that the nexus approach requires,
although there are some distinctions here that we are going to have to
deal with and talk about, I think what it does is it fairly represents the
purpose of the ADA because the purpose of the ADA is to apply to a
specific group of private entities very broad antidiscrimination principles, and that is really what we are doing here. Otherwise I think we
would be reading into a statute a very broad prohibition on discrimination on a very broad group of entities that Congress did not necessarily
intend to have subject to the ADA.
I am going to now pass it on to Robin and let her talk about that, and
then we will take some questions.
MS. ANDERSON: Good morning. First I would like to thank Mercer
Law School and the members of the Law Review for their offer to be
here this morning and the wonderful hospitality they have shown me on
my first trip to Macon. I am a member from the state of North Carolina
and to some of y'all, a Yankee. But to be able to come so far south of the
Mason-Dixon Line is truly an honor.
Second, as I launch into my time, please remember that the contentions that I am going to set forth here-that the Internet is not a place
of public accommodation that should be accessible to all members with
disabilities may not be those of my personal beliefs. But as I drew the
short straw, that is what I will be setting forth. So therefore, my
argument may not seem to be politically correct. However, I still think
and contend that it is supported by case law and by practical application. It kind of sounds like I am not really a lawyer, I just play one on
television. So just bear with me.
As Professor Milani did mention, I do practice on both sides of the
fence when it comes to discrimination issues. And for anyone who knows
the Fourth Circuit, which is where my jurisdiction is, you would know
that is a matter of necessity rather than one of choice.
But having said that, before I came down here, my assistant and I
reviewed my practice and took stock of where my litigation is going.
Have I effectuated good? What kind of clients have I represented? And
I thought that coming to the symposium was a good opportunity for me
to go back over my thirteen years of practice and look at my discrimination litigation and determine what I have done. The result of the review
was interesting.
The ADA was enacted the same year I graduated law school and
actually helped me determine what kind of litigation I wanted to do. It
is a fairly substantial part, about maybe one third to one half, of my
practice. What I determined is that over the years I have assisted in
over seven million dollars in settlements or reasonable accommodation
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costs in disability litigation. Well what was most interesting about that
number was not what was the total amount number, but the fact that
it was a dollar here and a dollar there. Almost every case was what I
would call a baby step. That is, every case that I am involved with,
especially in the Fourth Circuit, has been with very, very slow progressive change. On a case-by-case basis each lawyer tries to be able to fit
the facts with the law and with the judge. Hopefully, the client's goals
are accomplished.
Before I flew down yesterday, I consulted my most valuable resource
on the topics of my life. I picked up the phone, and I called my mom.
She was very interested in the symposium topic we are covering today.
Four years ago my mother lost her sight. She has since been battling
learning Braille, trying to get around, and she is extremely mad that she
lost her license. She still does not understand why she should not be
able to drive, but that is outside today's point. As she is very opinionated and not able to keep her opinions to herself, she shared her thoughts
about whether the Internet is a place of public accommodation. That is
probably where I get it from. But anyhow, I talked to her about the
topic. And I thought her take on it was rather interesting and a little
shocking being her daughter.
I went on and explained about the Internet and the ADA. My mother
actually goes on the Internet quite frequently. As she is my greatest
source of junk e-mail, I know how much she uses it. But, anyhow, she
said, which I found rather interesting, "Look, I think I should be entitled
to find and enter the front door of Wal-Mart. I also think that I should
be able to find and have access to public restrooms. But, you know, I am
not really sure I want equal access to all of those websites of pornography." After I stopped chuckling, I said, "Mom, how do you know about
those pornography websites?" She replied, "Because your dad told me."
I said, "I don't want to know this. This is too much information."
I stopped to realize that as we discuss equal access to all websites, the
question becomes: Do we want to have them all accessible, or are there
only specific websites? For example, let us say you like to go camping,
and you are a big L.L. Bean fan. You may want to make sure that its
catalog website is accessible to all those with disabilities. Or are we
talking about having accessibility to everything?
Which leads me to my dad. One of the things that I was trying to
determine is that if we go from Mr. Willis's approach-that it should be
blanket accessibility--or Mr. Moberly's nexus approach-that if you have
a store front then you have a heightened responsibility to provide public
accommodation-I started thinking about my dad. My dad calls it his
little "stash of cash." He has decided that he wants to have a separate
checking account with a little spending money, and he carves wood
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ducks. And so he spends his year carving, and he sells his wares at his
little store front. Well, one of the things that a family member has done
is design a website for my dad, and most of his work is sold through his
website. And that is how he gets his carvings out there to the buying
public. And we are not talking about a great amount of money here, we
are just talking about a little spending cash. Well, the difficulty is if we
go and we follow some of the thought processes presented here, it will
cost him a certain amount of money, which I will talk about in just a
minute, in order for him to have his website accessible to all.
Further, if we are not careful in defining what type of website is going
to be accessible or not accessible at what cost is it going to be for the rest
of us? Is requiring across the board accessibility going to basically stop
E-commerce and trade? Even for those of us who sell things on eBay?
I mean, at what point are we going to balance the economic interests?
And would somebody like my dad be shut down because he could not
afford to have a website designed that is going to be accessible to all?
My understanding from all of the research I have done is that the goal
and the purpose of the Internet is to level the economic playing field. It
is to allow the Mom and Pop stores, say up in Seattle having a small
camping and supply store, to be able to get their goods and services out
there on the same level with L.L. Bean. The thing is, if the courts adopt
the nexus approach, then those same two vastly different companies will
have the same obligations to have the advanced software that is going
to allow disability access. It will cost the same for the Mom and Pop
store as it would for L.L. Bean. Identical cost to amend or modify their
websites.
One of the facts I found interesting is that ninety-eight percent of all
websites are not accessible to the disabled. I am in charge of our
website for our law firm, and I have not gotten a solid answer yet about
whether or not my law firm's website is accessibile to the disabled. For
all of us who have individual or company websites or who have family
members who own websites, it is most likely that they are not accessible.
To further add to the difficulty, congressional hearings occurred and
stalemated. There has not been any discernable result from those
discussions in Washington. I think that one of the challenges to
Congress is that it is not clear cut on what you do to make your website
accessible. There is a book that describes how to design an accessible
website. But one of the difficulties is that every individual with a
disability may have different types of software, for example, those for the
hearing impaired or physically impaired or mentally handicapped. The
ADA covers a wide variety of disabilities without a single solution. For
example, it is not like widening your door or putting in a ramp, which
was contemplated by the ADA. There is not a single concrete solution.
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And I think part of the difficulty, of course, that we are talking about is
the Internet. How to fix this problem may be cost prohibitive. To
second-guess what the new technology will be and to make sure each
umpany has a website that will accommodate for each of the different
disabilities will be economically infeasible.
One of the things that I was able to do prior to coming here today as
recently elected Chair of the State Personnel Commission for the State
of North Carolina, a bird's eye view of the 120,000 state employees in
North Carolina, was to access the information on the economic impact
of website accessibility on a larger employer. However, different than
the issue being addressed today, state and federal governments are
regulated by a different disability title with a higher responsibility to the
public to make sure that their websites are accessible. What was
interesting about North Carolina's state legislation is that North
Carolina had certain financial caps. The legislation stated that if the
cost of the modification was going to be in excess of a certain percentage
of that individual employee's salary, then it would not be required to
install that accommodation. New legislation has removed the cap from
the statute. State agencies are now required to make all accommodations, irrespective of cost.
I placed a call to locate what it costs the State of North Carolina to
make the web accessible for all individuals with disabilities. They are
in the process of trying to identify that number, but it was significant.
A difficulty is that the state would get a request from somebody with a
particular software need that they had not come across yet. The state
would have to go out and make sure that they could accommodate it. As
the Internet, software, and disabilities are constantly evolving and
changing, this can make accommodation impractible. So even though
North Carolina determined that they had at one point caught up,
evolving software was costing the state a substantial amount of money
to accommodate it. Now if a state is having that much difficulty doing
it, I cannot begin to even imagine what my dad is going to be able to do.
And at some point I read information regarding a "universal Web
page" that allows a web designer to accommodate a substantial variety
of disability needs. Various sources indicate that to require such a
design for everyone would most likely shut down all the Mom-and-Pop
websites.
But obviously there are some very significant public policy issues at
the core. There are 43 million Americans who have a disability, either
mental or physical. There are 10 million who are visually impaired.
And of those 10 million visually impaired, there are 1.5 million who use
the Internet. Now, it would seem logical that if you want to be able to
sell your goods and services, you would voluntarily do the "right thing,"
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and be in compliance and on the cutting edge. L.L. Bean's goal is to
service its customers and be out in the marketplace and sell. One would
hope an accommodation would occur voluntarily. However, the difficulty
is that it is not happening voluntarily, and that is why there is now
litigation. It is my impression that the only reason why companies are
not in voluntary compliance is because of the economic cost.
AOL Time Warner settled a lawsuit approximately five years ago, and
voluntarily did the "right thing" by redesigning web access. However,
this type of change will be slow in coming. Part of the difficulty is
getting consensus in the Internet industry: Having them getting their
hands around what websites can do and how websites can be designed
most cost efficiently.
Now, Professor Milani did address how the language of the ADA and
the evolving terminology of the Internet may be consistent. There are
chat "rooms" and the information "highway."
Now, alternatively, there is the term "Internet," a network to bring
interrelationships or intercommunication together. It is my opinion that
the label "Internet" as a "network" is not a "place" as defined under the
ADA. It is a means to bring people together-the "Worldwide Web."
Other terms are "cyberspace" and "virtual reality," which also do not
connotate "place." Metaphors are extremely important in how we and
the courts identify whether the ADA applies to the Internet. When you
address these terms, most of the courts hold that the Internet is not a
place of public accommodation.
Personally, the Internet is a liquid, interactive newspaper because that
is how it functions for me. I use it mostly for research. I occasionally
go onto eBay to see if I can find something interesting. But primarily
for me it is not commerce but a means of gathering information. I think
to each one of us, as it is a fairly new phenomenon and was not readily
available until 1993, the Internet is an evolving concept. As such,
litigation has only just surfaced in the last two years, since 2002.
The first case you have heard about is Southwest Airlines, where a
virtual ticket counter is discussed. The court in Southwest held that a
virtual ticket counter is not hooked to any physical, geographic location.
The court in Southwest distinguished itself from the Rendon case ("Who
Wants to be a Millionaire") holding that a fast-finger exercise on the
telephone was causally connected to a physically, located phone bank,
and therefore, the ADA applied.
It appears that both the "virtual ticket counter" and a telephone line
fast finger connection are legal fictions. Where is the difference between
a phone line and a telephone call to win a million dollars and then the
disabled customers of Southwest on the Internet trying to get a cheaper
price for their airline ticket? The Eleventh Circuit, where Southwest is
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on appeal, will have to address and resolve some of these intellectual
and legal problems that technology has created. For now the federal
district court in Southwest has definitively held that access to the
website, this virtual ticket counter, was not a place of public accommodation.
I contend that the decision in Southwest is supported by, and is
consistent with, other types of analogous litigation. For example, there
was a case in the Supreme Court of California by a former employee who
was really unhappy with the way Intel had terminated his employment
[Intel Corp. v. Hamidi]."6 He somehow got hold of his former employer's e-mail address list. The former employee lost in the two lower
courts but he was successful on appeal at the California Supreme Court.
The employee had sent out mass e-mails six or seven times. Intel
contended that its e-mail addresses were defined as property. Intel
argued that the employee trespassed into its e-mail system, and he came
onto its property. Intel warned him not to do it. He did it again. The
employee responded and couched his argument under a First Amendment analysis and a right to free speech, and that it was not trespass.
The employee's argument was that e-mail is not a place but a thing.
Perhaps another state cause of action, for example, tortious interference
with contract or other action might apply. This opinion was touted as
a huge victory for individual personal rights. The Intel decision, holding
that the Internet for e-mail purposes is not a place of trespass protecting
individual rights in California, is inconsistent with arguing it is a place
for public accommodation under the ADA.
Even under the Intel rubric, I think the case law as far as the opinion
in Southwest is fairly clear, at least in the Southern District of Florida,
that the Internet is not a place of public accommodation. However, on
the other hand, we have "Who Wants to be a Millionaire?" and whether
that is the "final answer" or not as to whether or not there is some kind
of distinction between a telephone line and accessing information on the
Internet.
One of the other interesting cases is Noah v. AOL, decided under the
Civil Rights Act, where a gentleman had been discriminated against
based on religion in a "chat room." The court stated that a chat room is
not a place of public accommodation and the statute did not apply.
So the question is-where do we go from here? We have at least 1.5
million visually impaired, and numerous other hearing impaired and
others with disabilities, who use the Internet and who do not have
access to practically ninety-eight percent of the websites. It is apparent
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that something needs to be done. However, I am not sure exactly what.
Litigation under the ADA is not the answer. Congress needs to address
the issue of web accessibility under the ADA. But Congress has not
stepped up to the plate even after its hearings.
My proposal, for consideration and thought, is neither across the board
accessibility nor the nexus approach discussed earlier, but a balancing
test similar to that in the employment context. Under Title VII, there
are terms like "reasonable accommodations." And most importantly,
under employment disability discrimination, there is a small business
exception for employers with under fifteen employees. A compromise in
Congress was reached to allow small businesses exemption from the
ADA for certain purposes. Now obviously we cannot count heads of
employees for website accessibility purposes, but perhaps an economic
line could be drawn. There needs to be a dialogue that balances the
economic interests of making sure that we have an ability to keep
smaller websites out there, functioning and flourishing, but also be able
to prioritize the majority of software needs to allow as many of the
disabled Internet accommodation.
And hopefully as these symposium discussions grow, word to
businesses to self-regulate will spread. I have already written an article
for my law firm's newsletter that is disseminated to employers to be
more consciously aware of Internet restrictions. If there is an ability to
show them that they can accommodate in a cost effective way, they will
voluntarily opt to do so. I believe over the next five years an increasing
trend by websites designers will be noticeable.
Thank you very much for three very
PROFESSOR MILANI:
enlightening presentations. I will try to ask a few questions, and then
I will open it up to the rest of the panel.
First, I would like to ask Tim Willis a couple of questions about the
concerns Mr. Moberly raised regarding the issue of cost, specifically the
cost to small businesses. Tim, can you give us an idea of what it costs
to make a website accessible, and what is your response to the concerns
that they have raised?
MR. WILLIS: Yes, I do understand that there is a cost, but cost is
usually when you have to go back and redo a website after it is already
been done. I am currently plaintiff's counsel in a case against a hotel
chain about their website. It is in the discovery phase now. And based
on our expert witness, the cost is in this litigation, in hiring expert
witnesses, and not in actually fixing the websites. But according to my
expert witness, most of these websites that are the subject of this kind
of litigation are built with what is called templates, and there are ten or
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twelve templates that filter all the information through the website, that
anytime information comes into the website it goes through these
templates. And if those templates are built correctly, then the website
jib uccebsible.
Now I will say that in the MARTA litigation, when they had to make
their website accessible, the cost that they incurred was because they
had to redo their entire website because it was pretty much totally
inaccessible. I do not remember the dollar figure in the settlement
agreement. They had to spend so much for the next three years in
actually having an expert monitor the website, and I do not recall how
much the extra price was, but I do have some sympathy for, or some
concern for what Robin brings up, the small businesses. And, really,
from a practical standpoint I probably lean that way as well, that there
are some entities out there that should not be burdened. But the ADA
provides the defenses for undue burdens and so forth, and you have to
get by the first threshold issue. So I think the defenses are in place
under the ADA. It is just a matter of going beyond that to then do the
balancing test.
PROFESSOR MILANI: Okay. I will move next to Richard Moberly.
Richard, the only reason I told you that it is difficult to be in the middle
is I have been in that position. It was meant to be a warning. I wrote
an article a few years ago, which was published in the Wisconsin Law
Review that had to do with an ADA issue about whether you needed
prior notice before you could sue public accommodations.17 Some courts
had said you always have to provide notice and a person has to exhaust
administrative remedies, and some courts had said you never have to
provide notice and you don't have to exhaust administrative remedies.
I took a middle position, and everybody was unhappy with me. So I
sympathize with your plight today, and that was what I was trying to
let you know about.
My concern here, we talk about small businesses and costs and the
approach which I understand you are advocating, is that we can have an
entity like Amazon.com or an entity like Yahoo!, which are both publicly
traded businesses. Their stock was worth a lot more three years ago
than it is now. But nonetheless, they are both multi-million dollar
corporations in terms of their market value. They may not generate that
much profit. Those companies would not be covered, but the Mom-andPop store would. How do you respond to that concern?

17. Adam.Milani, Go Ahead. Make my Ninety Days: Should Plaintiffs be Required to
Provide Notice to Defendants Before Filing Suit Under Title III of the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct? 2001 WIS. L. REV. 107 (2001).
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MR. MOBERLY: The first thing I think we ought to remember is that
there is nothing wrong in the law with having distinctions between
different types of businesses. In fact, some have said that it is the
purpose of the law itself to draw distinctions. So even under the ADA,
under Title I, Robin mentioned the employment situation, the ADA does
not apply if you have fourteen employees, but it applies if you have
fifteen. That is a distinction. The ADA in Title III itself does not apply
to all commercial entities. It applies to places of public accommodation.
Places that are not open to the public, that operate warehouses or run
out of their garage and sell things solely over the Internet, would not be
covered by the ADA. So there are distinctions within the ADA itself.
I think, though, that your criticism has some validity. I do not want
to underplay it. And I will even put it in a more stark contrast than I
did before. You have two pretty much equal entities in Barnesandnoble
.com and Amazon.com, who are doing the same thing. Yet one is going
to be under this burden and one is not. However, when you open up a
public place, there are certain burdens that you take on. When you open
up a store front, you have to make it accessible whether it is by a
wheelchair or not, or whether it is physically accessible, and I would say
or whether it is accessible over the Internet. There are burdens that
Congress has decided to place on entities that open up physical places
of public accommodation, and Congress has not decided to make those
burdens applicable to companies that don't do that.
For example, I think there is a misconception that under the ADA if
you ran a catalog-only service, if you had a big warehouse and you just
sent out catalogs, I think there is a question under the ADA whether
your company would even be required to comply with the ADA because
you don't have a place that is actually open to the public. You send out
catalogs. I would put the Internet in that same type of situation, where
if you do not operate a place open to the public, you merely are
communicating through mass communication from your warehouse.
That is my view of it.
And I think there are a number of justifications for why you would
have that distinction. At the end of the day, maybe that distinction will
make Congress act.
And the other thing I think is important to remember is that by
having a more nuanced approach, that as an economic matter, once
businesses start making their website accessible, those 1.5 million
consumers are not going to go to Amazon.com, they are going to go to
Barnesandnoble.com, who is going to get an economic boost from that,
which hopefully may lead to some private resolution of this. I mean
Amazon is certainly going to notice that. And of course, when I have
told people that before, their response, and I think it was a good one, is,
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well, shouldn't that happen anyway? You know if there really is an
economic benefit to it, shouldn't Amazon be doing it already? But I
think what the experience of the ADA has taught us is that there is an
economic benefit from making places physically accessible and accessible
in general, but that companies tend not to notice it until they are forced
to do it. And there are a number of studies out there whereby forcing
companies into compliance with something like the ADA they actually
will reap economic benefits from it but they are not necessarily willing
to take that risk on their own.
PROFESSOR MILANI: Before I ask Ms. Anderson a question, I will
agree totally with what Mr. Moberly said. There is a great story which
goes back to the Rehabilitation Act which he mentioned applies to people
who receive federal funds and federal governmental entities. One of the
first cases that was brought dealt with the accessibility to the post office,
which is run by the federal government. Someone sued the post office
saying that it was not wheelchair accessible because there were a
number of steps up to the post office. The postmaster did not understand why that was a problem because he had never had people in
wheelchairs in the post office. Someone explained, yes, because there
are five steps into the post office.
People have taken that same approach in the business arena. "We
don't have people with visual impairments coming into our store or our
website," or "We don't have people with auditory impairments requesting
interpreters." That is true because, if they are not available they will
not be requested. So it is a matter of the mindset.
I think this goes back to something which Tim Willis said in the
beginning and that is it was not until architects were told by federal law
and state law that you have to start designing buildings in a way that
ensures access (there are ramps, there is Braille on the elevators and on
the bathroom doors) that they began doing that. And maybe the same
thing should happen here.
My question to Ms. Anderson is the approach that you advocate, let's
carve out a small business exception, I am not sure that the number of
employees is perhaps the way to do it. My question is: What about if
you put into the regulations that if your website gets X number of hits
(I have no idea what X would be), then it is covered by the statute. If
it gets fewer hits than that, then it should not be. Is that an approach
which you would be comfortable with and how do you see it working?

MS. ANDERSON: We are out of time, aren't we?
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PROFESSOR MILANI: We have five minutes.
MS. ANDERSON: I think that the restriction is in the language of
the statute. I would agree that some sort of small business exception
might be the right way to do things under the current ADA. However,
it is my opinion that there needs to be an amendment to the ADA. The
language of the statute, the strict interpretation of the "public accommodation" language, specifically enumerates "inns, motels, hotels,
restaurants, bars, etc." The Internet is nowhere even contemplated in
this language. The list addresses physical locations. A few of my
personal favorites are funeral parlors and shoe repair services. Now can
you imagine what the legislators who were drafting this language did?
They must have jotted down everything that they did over a month's
period to figure out what they were going to define as a place of public
accommodation, and obviously the Internet did not make the cut. And
so I think that what is going to happen is that through congressional
dialogue, they will need to change the language of the ADA. Under the
current language of the ADA, even with a small business exception, the
enumerated list is not inclusive of changing technology and does not
allow for expansion.
PROFESSOR MILANI: Thank you. And do we have any questions
from the audience? Professor Nehf?
PROFESSOR NEHF: I was wondering if any of you know whether or
not Congress is contemplating or had legislative discussions about this
issue?
MR. MOBERLY: The House Judiciary Committee held a hearing, a
day long hearing. They had Internet business representatives; they had
advocates for individuals with disabilities; they had technical people
describing what it would take. I have read the entire transcript, and I
think Robin describes it best as inconclusive. You have people who say,
if the ADA applies, we are going to be tearing down millions of websites
every day to make them accessible and it would be a huge burden. And
then you have other people who propose the position much like Tim did
that this is really not going to be that big a deal if you do it, especially
if you do it from the beginning. I think revamping a website everyone
agrees would be a more arduous task.
From a legal matter, you know, they debated the exact same things
that we have debated here today: Should it apply? Nothing has
happened.
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PROFESSOR NEHF: But no legislation is proposed otherwise?
MR. MOBERLY: No.
PROFESSOR MILANI: Any other questions? Yes.
AUDIENCE: My question is directed to Mr. Moberly who brought up
this point, but anyone from the panel may answer. You brought up the
point that for someone like Amazon.com, he would have to change the
content of his website. I guess my point would be that they would be
changing more than the format of their website. I am just having a
difficult time understanding that distinction.
MR. MOBERLY: Sure. That probably depends on whether you look
at the glass as half full or half empty. I mean I think the argument that
was pertaining to Amazon or Map Quest is that the very format, how
they set it up, is a business decision, the way they present their
material, that they should not have to change. There is almost a
proprietary way in which you set up something to make it easy for the
user you anticipate using it to use. There will be changes. An accessible
website often looks different than a nonaccessible website. Part of the
problem with all of this is, in the early 1990s, the Internet was basically
textual. If you remember, it was very boring to look at. I mean you just
read text. Now because of broadband, people have greater access. There
are rockets shooting up, colors moving around, pictures coming in and
out, and a lot of places believe that that is a very proprietary way that
they are presenting their business. And to get rid of some of those for
someone who is let's say color blind, reducing the amount of colors on the
screen, for someone who is learning disabled making it a simpler way to
use the website, for someone that cannot move their hand very well and
can't use a mouse, you need to tab from various column to column as
opposed to pointing and clicking. So I think that is kind of a content
issue. But I see your point. I think that is a good point. I do not know
if anybody else wants to address it.
PROFESSOR MILANI: There was a question over here also.
AUDIENCE: This question is not so much about the legal issues. It
is more a question for Mr. Willis. Just as a practical everyday attorney
in the field, so much of our research, especially unpublished opinions, is
done on the Internet. I was just curious as to what some of these legal
research sources on the Internet have done to accommodate.
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MR. WILLIS: Okay. That is a very good question and very much on
point. I was a law student here not very many years ago. And of
course, the vast majority of our legal research was done, well, I guess it
was supposed to be done in the library but, you know, people did it on
Westlaw. And when I was in law school in the late 1990s, Westlaw,
their website was kind of accessible. It probably would not pass any sort
of accessibility standard of an expert looking at it, but also at that time
the assisted technology software that I was using was not nearly as
advanced as it is now because it has made rapid advancements. But due
to section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act, in which Westlaw had a huge
federal contract, the federal government told Westlaw if you want to
keep your federal contract, you need to make sure your website is
accessible. Actually they have a separate website that is actually called
Text.Westlaw.com and, if you want to see what an accessible website
would look like, they have stripped it down. The goal of Westlaw,
number one, is to meet the accessibility requirements so they do not lose
their federal contract. By using Text.Westlaw.com, you are able to
consult text, you are able to actually use it in a courtroom through a
mobile device because it does not take up as much to download
information and so forth. So Westlaw took it from two approaches.
Number one, to follow the mandates of the feds but also to hope to grow
its business so that people could use that in a more remote way.
But, yes, the other thing on the day-to-day stuff as an attorney, there
is a thing out there called pacer [public access to court's electronic
records]. I do not know if you all are familiar with it, but courts use it
to post all of their decisions. From my initial view of that, it is not
accessible. And that is a federal service and federal website, and I do
perceive that at some point a Title VIII claim being brought against the
federal judiciary. I do not know who is going to rule on that, but I am
sure someone will lodge a complaint at some point.
PROFESSOR MILANI: Other questions? If not, then we have done
the impossible. We have finished precisely on time. I would like to
thank our panelists for their presentations this morning.
(SHORT BREAK)
PROFESSOR MILANI: Thank you for those of you who have
returned. To those of you who are just coming, welcome. I have a quick
announcement. If we have any attorneys who are here to get CLE
credit, please make sure you have signed up so you can get CLE credit.
I see some of our more recent graduates whom I assume are here to get
CLE credit. They are not just here because they are interested in the
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topic or because they work for the law firm of one of our panelists. But
even if those are true, you can still get CLE credit, so please sign up.
Our second panel this morning is going to deal with the issue of
spamming. And any individual who has an e-mail address receives
spain. Some of those spams you delete really really quickly because you
do not want anybody coming to your computer seeing some of these "Re"
lines on there. We will not get into those since it is going to be
transcribed into the record, and I do not want it to appear after my
name. So you receive spam, and you probably hit the delete key very
quickly. And the question is whether the ability to hit the delete key
very quickly is enough of a solution to the problem that the Internet
Service Provider (ISP) should not have to worry about it. Or do the ISPs
have greater concerns?
Our first presenter is Jennifer Granick, who is a lecturer in law and
Executive Director of the Center for Internet and Society at Stanford
Law School. Ms. Granick is nationally recognized for her expertise
across a broad spectrum of Internet issues including computer crime,
national security, and constitutional rights. She is a graduate of the
University of California, Hastings College of Law.
Our second presenter is Paul F. Wellborn, III, known as Pete, who is
a founding member and a partner in the firm of Wellborn & Butler in
Atlanta. He is most well known probably for representing Earthlink, the
Atlanta-based ISP. On behalf of Earthlink and others, he has obtained
multi-million dollar judgments against spammers. He has also been an
adjunct professor at both of his alma maters, Georgia Tech and the
Mercer Law School, teaching about Internet law. He is here today to
talk to us about his perspective, as someone who represents ISPs.
But first we will begin with Ms. Granick.
MS. GRANICK: Good morning. Thank you for having me. So let's
have a short quiz. How many people here use the Internet? Okay. How
many people here use something other than e-mail or the Web? A couple
of file sharers back there. How many people, with their e-mail, how
many people get spam? How many people think spain is a problem?
Okay. How many people who are getting e-mail spam are using
Earthlink? That is me, too. So maybe Earthlink needs to crack down
more.
But what I am here to argue is MR. WELLBORN: I get my turn in a few minutes. She gets twenty
minutes.
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MS. GRANICK: I am here to argue something different than that the
ISPs need to crack down more. I am here to argue that the metaphor of
cyberspace as place is actually a proxy, that that metaphor has become
a proxy for efforts to control content. Is the Internet a place? Clearly,
no. It is not a place like other places that we have been. It is not a
place like Mercer Law School. But it has the characteristics, some
characteristics like a place.
Is the Internet a thing? Clearly, no. It is made up of things. It is
made up of computers. It is made up of wires. But together it is a
network. And the thing about a network is that networks have network
effects. They have emergent properties. They are something more than
the sum of their parts.
But the metaphor of cyberspace as a place or cyberspace as things is
accepted currently. A lot of it feels right. When you are in a chat room,
in the old days back when I got on the Internet back in 1991, we did not
have chat rooms, we had channels. You had channels and IRCs. You
did not have that metaphor, you did not even speak of it as being a
room. That is a more recent development, the idea of where you chat as
being an actual physical place, and it is not necessarily the way that we
have to look at it. There are other ways to look at it, too. But that
metaphor, that experience when you are on the Internet, of it being a
place is something that feels right.
And so as a result, what courts have done-because the Internet is
new and also because many judges, unlike people in this room, actually
do not use the Internet--is that judges have looked to metaphors or
analogies or comparisons with things that we are more familiar with in
order to figure out how and when to regulate the Internet.
So our discussion right now is about spam. And I am going to define
spare. Spare is usually defined as unwanted bulk commercial e-mail.
There are other kinds of unwanted e-mail which we will talk about in a
little bit. But usually when we are talking about spare, we are talking
about those commercial solicitations that we are all so familiar with.
The first case that really looked at, or really used, the concept of the
Internet as a place upon which you could trespass, a place where
unwanted contact or unwanted messages, unwanted electrons really,
because that is what all messages on the Internet truly are is just
electrons, were a trespass was in 1996, Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek.' 8
This case claimed an act of conversion, a type of theft, against the
parents of some phone phreaker kids. Who knows what phone
phreaking is? Thank you, somebody does. Phone phreaking is a type of
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computer hacking involving the phone system, and you need an intimate
knowledge of the system and how the switching system works, and that
can give you an immense amount of access to, not only to free long
distance and telephone calls but also to iisiening in on other peoples
conversations and that sort of thing. Probably one of the more wellknown phone phreak cases involved somebody who had such a mastery
over the phone system and such control that they were able to rig radio
station contests. So if you called in and you were caller number ten, you
would win a Porsche, then what these people were able to do was always
be caller number ten, and they and all their friends were winning
Porsches.
And actually it is not that hard to do. Basically I can explain how it
works. Now the note pads come out. You have a couple of different
lines. What happens is if you call the main radio station line, if that one
is busy, it rolls over to the next. If that one is busy, it rolls over to the
next. So anybody who has set up a phone system for work may know if
you have a couple of lines if you call the main number then it will roll
over. But what they did is they basically found out what the rollover
lines were, and they just cut off the rollover to it. So if you called, you
would get the main number. Now instead of rolling over you would get
a busy signal, and they would just call in directly to the rollover lines.
So they were blocking the rest of the public from reaching the rollover
lines, and only they and their cohorts were getting into those lines. So
it made their odds of winning the Porsche higher.
In Thrifty Tel the court said, well, these electrons that are coming into
this phone system are trespass-to-chattels. And this was sort of the first
real indication of the concept of trespass-to-chattels in this context. It
was not something that the lawyers actually had argued. It would be
nice for our profession if it was some smart lawyer, but actually it was
the court that came up with this. It reawakened the trespass-to-chattels
tort, which had been kind of sleeping a quiet sleep in the annals of
common law, and it became something that was very popular to use in
Internet cases and particularly to address the issue of spam. Here is a
question I did not ask. Who here likes spain? See, everybody hates
spain. Nobody likes spam. And spam, it is amazing actually how
people's dislike for spain has kind of wrecked the Internet. Not only in
the way that I am about to discuss but in numerous other ways in which
regulations have been put into effect that have made the Internet work
less well in an effort to stop this kind of flood of unwanted commercial
communication.
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So after Thrifty-Tel, there is a case in 1997, CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber
Promotions,Inc.,'9 in which the ISP was successful in saying that these
unwanted spams from Cyber Promotions, which they had tried to filter
but failed, were harming their chattel, that is their Internet service.
And the court said that there were three ways in which they were
harmed. One was the burden on the equipment, or the burden on the
e-mail equipment of carrying this extra traffic. Two was the time that
the ISP employees spent trying to block these unwanted e-mails that
disturbed the ISPs customers so much. And three was customer
goodwill because customers were upset and unhappy that when they
were using the CompuServ service that they were getting all this spam.
That case led to two cases in 1998 where AOL also used the trespassto-chattels tort to say these servers are our property and we have the
right to say to you, "No, I'm sorry, you can't send us these e-mails." But
if you look at these cases, and you read them and look at the nature of
the harm that the court finds here, they are really finding a different
kind of harm than the harm that was traditionally cognizable under the
trespass-to-chattels tort.
Under trespass-to-chattels there is no absolute right to exclude
unwanted intrusion. The classic example of this is with a dog. A dog is
property, even though you may not agree. For all the animal rights
people out there, I also have a cat and I do not think of him as property.
But traditionally dogs and cats were thought of as property. And you
could pet my dog and I could not sue you; but if you kicked my dog, then
you are harming him, and I could sue. So if you use the dog in the way
in which he is intended to be used, which is petting and loving him, then
that is okay. But you cannot hurt him; that would be actionable.
But looking at the cases, the spain cases, you see that really the courts
are looking at this not as a harm to the server, that the e-mail server is
somehow being used in some way that is harmful to it, but another kind
of harm, harm to the company's business and the company's desire to
have its business operate in a certain way, either its reputation with
customers or harm to its preferred way of doing business. And so these
cases developed so that, where even though the courts would sort of pay
lip service to trespass-to-chattels they were really looking at a trespass
right that was more like a real property right, and a real property right
is an absolute right to exclude unwanted uses.
The next big case in this trend of trespass-to-chattels cases was eBay,
Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc.2 ° In eBay, eBay challenged an auction
aggregator company's right to collect information about eBay auctions
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and to present it in a different format. eBay's complaint was that this
auction aggregator had a little software robot that would come on eBay's
site and collect information and data about these auctions and then it
put that data elsewhere. We are going to talk about this type of thing
a little bit later this afternoon when we talk about scraping. eBay was
not really a spain case, but what it did say is any use, however slight,
is something where you can have an injunction against that use. Not
even so much because the Bidder's Edge robot was taking up or harming
eBay's servers in any way. In fact the Bidder's Edge software robots
were less than two percent of the total load on eBay's system, but
because in aggregate and with potential unwanted use by others, that
was a sufficient harm that could result in system unavailability for
eBay. So there was no actual harm. It was the threat of system
unavailability as a result of the defendant's actions in conjunction with
others, the potential harm, and so they were allowed to exclude this
unwanted use.
So the court in eBay rejected the real world analogy that the plaintiff,
eBay, tried to present to them. eBay said this would be like if robots
came into a store and were taking up the time of the salespeople buying
stuff. I am enough of a science fiction geek to think that might be kind
of cool, but the court said, well, it is not really a great analogy. You
would need two out of every hundred customers who would be robots,
and the robots would not actually be seen by the customers. They would
be invisible robots. That is already less cool. Hence it is not really a
good analogy. And I think that is one of the things that we have to
really be careful about in this area is that analogies are really here to
help us, but none of them are really good analogies because the Internet
is something that is really new and something that we really have not
seen before.
So, the court in eBay nevertheless found that this use was or could be
enough of a significant trespass for eBay to get a preliminary injunction.
So the problem is if you have a trespass or a trespass tort where you
do not need to show any actual harm to the server and any actual harm
to the chattel, then basically any unwanted traffic, any wanted traffic
becomes trespassing. There is this absolute right for the server owner
to exclude.
What is the problem with that? Well we see that problem in Intel
Corp. v. Hamidi,2 ' recently decided by the California Supreme Court.
In this case Intel sued and obtained an injunction against its former
employee, Ken Hamidi, who later ran for governor in California in our
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recent recall election. I do not know how many votes he got, but he did
not finish in the top five. They wanted Hamidi to stop sending them emails, which were critical of Intel's employment policies. Why did they
want to do this? Did it harm Intel's servers? No. Although certainly
these electrons had some effect on Intel's servers because Intel's e-mail
server had to process them. But Hamidi was sending an e-mail like
anybody would send e-mails. Truthfully he was not sending Intel emails. He was sending e-mails to Intel's employees. And if Intel's
employees no longer wanted to receive his e-mails, they could communicate that to Mr. Hamidi, and he would take them off of his list. The
problem was that employees of Intel had to deal with trying to filter
these e-mails because they did not want the other employees to read
them and that they had to address the employee concerns when
employees got these e-mails claiming maybe Intel is a bad place to work
and, the employees are wondering, "Why am I getting these e-mails
telling me that Intel is a bad place to work," and those kinds of concerns.
One of the things that really shows how the metaphor overtook actual
truth and reason in Intel is, well, let me first tell you what ends up
happening. Mr. Hamidi lost and there is an injunction against him
saying you cannot send employees of Intel any more e-mails. He lost at
the appellate level. And then he appealed to the California Supreme
Court, and the California Supreme Court ruled on the narrow trespassto-chattels ground and said that under California common law trespassto-chattels requires harm to the server. And I know that George is going
to talk a lot more about Intel later on, so I just wanted to point it out,
as well as the notion of harm to the server versus other kinds of
business harm. The California Supreme Court made the right decision
because what Intel was trying to do was not to protect its server, but to
try to stop its employees from getting the message that Intel is a bad
employer. That was what they wanted to prevent. So it led to this
illogical argument that they made during the litigation of the case,
which is that they were not suppressing Mr. Hamidi's speech because
Hamidi was free to put up a website and he could have his website say
whatever he wanted it to say and that would be fine.
But, here is the metaphor: You send e-mail, but you visit a website.
But actually the way that the Internet works is that receiving e-mail is
no different to Intel than visiting a website, the electrons from the email come through the Intel servers and the Intel employees when they
access the website, those electrons also come through the Intel server.
So it is the same exact thing in terms of the website maybe the
employees will not ever find it and know that it exists whereas with the
e-mails it is coming right to the employees.
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Now I think that those employees if they do not want to receive those
e-mails, they should be able to say to Mr. Hamidi do not send me those
e-mails anymore, and Mr. Hamidi would then have an obligation not to
send Chem anymore e-mauls. But what i do not think is that intel, as
the owner of the computer server, is entitled to make that decision for
the employees.
Let's put that in an Earthlink context. I have Earthlink and I think
it is excellent, but I do not want Earthlink to make decisions for me
about what e-mails I receive. I want to make that decision. And the
idea that it is the users of the Internet who make the decision about
what traffic, what content the Internet carries, is deeply imbedded in the
principles behind the Internet. The Internet was built on an end to end
principle. This is a common principle, which is that the network is
neutral. The network does not discriminate on the basis of content. It
does not say we carry e-mail traffic better than Web traffic. It does not
say we will not carry file share traffic, but we will carry Telnet.
Basically it is neutral. All electrons are the same. And the intelligence,
the discrimination in the Internet takes place on the ends of the
network, in the applications. So as long as you can conform to the basic
protocol, the basic computer language of the Internet, which is TCPIP,
you can write different applications and use those applications on the
network. That is why we have had such an immense amount of
innovation on the Internet and we have gotten things like the World
Wide Web.
Who here used the Internet before the Web? Anybody? So it is better
now with the Web in a lot of ways. I still like using the old stuff, but it
is better now. And the reason we can have cool stuff like the Web is
because we have this neutral protocol. So it is an engine for innovation.
But end to end is also an engine for innovation in speech. It allows you
and I as the communicators to determine what we hear instead of letting
the intermediaries decide. It is the way radio could have been. But
now, you know, you listen to whatever junk they play to you on the
radio. Well we do not have to have that on the Internet. We get to
decide, and if we give server owners the right to make that decision for
us, we have lost something very precious and very special about the way
the Internet works.
So the California Supreme Court in Intel did not address this free
speech concern. They decided on this very narrow trespass-to-chattels
ground, and there was a lot of Chicken Little, the sky is falling for
people after the Intel case. Oh, companies will not deploy e-mail
systems, and it is horrible for us and we will just have to accept spare
and it will be terrible and we have no rights to protect ourselves
anymore, none of which is true. If there is harm to the server, somebody
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sends you so many E-mails that your server cannot process it, then
certainly you would have a cause of action under trespass-to-chattels.
Nothing about this prevents either the United States Congress or
international bodies or state bodies from passing anti-spam laws.
Certainly statutes can give companies rights that the common law does
not give. And maybe Congress is really the place for this to occur
because there you can do a kind of balancing.
And that is what I advocate and what I recommend for the spam
problem and for the problem of any kind of unwanted e-mail is
balancing: that we balance the rights of the computer owners with the
public interests of free communication and free speech, and with the
interests of the people who are actually doing the communicating. And
that kind of balancing is going to lead to something that is much better
for speech, much better for the people who use the Internet and will still
protect the rights and interests of the property owners who want to
deploy their Internet systems. Intel could have made a decision that it
was going to filter all traffic and only accept e-mails that were business
related. It could have made a rule with its employees that said you are
not allowed to receive personal e-mails at work. There are a lot of
things that it could have tried to do, rather than say I pick you out of all
the people in the world and I do not want to receive your messages. Or
I pick the Democratic Party out of all the political parties in the world
and I do not want my employees receiving those messages. That kind
of absolute right to exclude is completely contrary and in opposition to
the very basis and the very sort of engineering principles and really the
social benefit that those engineering principles has resulted in with
respect to free speech on the Internet. We get to decide how we
communicate and that has made the Internet so valuable today.
Thank you.
MR. WELLBORN: I have been about to bust, so I am going to start
with my punch line. All spammers are criminal and ignorant. So I will
get to that later. That is not me talking, that is every court that has
considered the issue.
How many of you all have had Professor Cole here, Criminal
Procedure, Criminal Law? What is the right answer in his class?
AUDIENCE: Yes and no.
MR. WELLBORN: Yes and no, that is right. I did not get that here
but now to me that is one of the most profound things that I learned
here. It really, really is. And you will understand that the longer you
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practice. I got out of here in 1989. Anybody remember Calder v.
Jones?22 Civil Procedure? Shirley Jones, the mom from the Partridge
Family, sued the National Enquirer and a writer and publisher, but she
Sued them In Calurnia,her home state. The Enquirer, of course, had
plenty of contacts there so it was subject to jurisdiction, but the writer
and editor claimed they never had contacts to California. One had only
been there once for a two-day vacation, and one had never been there
and had no contacts at all. Out of that case came a great jurisdictional
rule, one that lets me sue anybody who ever did anything wrong to
Earthlink in Atlanta.
So this is my visual aid today [holding up a copy of the National
Enquirer]. We know now that Scott is going to get killed in prison, Di
was murdered, Matt Lauer does cocaine, and John Ritter's widow is
battling to save his show. What is this? Is this intellectual property?
Is this a thing? Is this a means of communication, a conduit for
publication? Is this minimum contact? And the answer is yes to all
those things. Which one of those answers is important totally depends
on the context that you are looking at it in. And it is the same thing
with our main question today-what is the Internet? Well, it is going
to be a different answer depending upon the context that you look at it
in. It might be a different analysis or answer for ADA than for
spamming than for First Amendment protected noncommercial type of
speech. So if you remember one thing after the seminar today,
remember that, the yes and no. It can be any of the above, but you have
to look at the particular context that you're examining the Internet in.
Spamming-we are talking about spamming this hour. What is
spamming? My definition is unsolicited commercial e-mail. You could
get six of the most prominent anti-spammers and six of the most
prominent spammers up here, and you might get twelve different
answers. I do not include a bulk aspect in my definition of spain
because spai from a user's point of view should not be determined or
defined based upon whether someone else suffered the same harm as I
did. So I pull the bulk out when I am defining it.
Spam is already illegal. And again, that is not me talking, that is
every court that has considered every case where an ISP has sued a
spammer. A spamming case in today's world, by definition, is going to
involve some form of fraud or spoofing because otherwise the filters will
catch it. You know who gets spare where it has the real from address
and the real remove address? There might be one in ten billion that has
honest information there. And remember the definition of spam, too, the
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word "unsolicited." If you sign up and you buy something at Sears, and
you check the box or do not uncheck the box or what-not, if they send
you mail, that is not unsolicited.
So we are talking unsolicited
commercial e-mail.
Let's talk about the invisible robots a little bit. The harm that is done,
the real harm that is done by these invisible robots. By the way, I want
to talk about what you all want to hear today. I would hate to have to
sit and listen to me talk for twenty minutes or thirty minutes or two
hours of whatever non-stop, so if you all have a question, I want to talk
about what you all want to hear. So do not hold it for the end and don't,
you know, be shy; just go ahead and ask. I would much rather have a
conversation just like the fifty of us were sitting around drinking beer
as opposed to a formal coat and tie speech at a seminar. So please, let's
make this a conversation.
The damage these invisible robots do, let's talk about that. Ten billion
dollars a year is the cost to businesses in lost worker productivity in
efforts to stop the spamming, to fight the spamming. Just the cost of
delivery, for an ISP to deliver an e-mail from point A to point B costs
about a tenth of a penny. That is no big deal, right. You know, even,
heck, if you have ten e-mails that's one cent. No big deal. Well it does
get to be a big deal when these spammers send a billion e-mails a year
which translates into a million dollars out of pocket for the ISP just to
deliver the e-mails. I am not talking about computer resources. That
is just what they pay for the band usage. I am not talking about the
storage, not talking about the user goodwill, not talking about the
attorney fees. Just getting that e-mail from point A to point B.
There is a cost in computer resources. Is that going to vary with ten
e-mails versus ten million e-mails? Certainly it is. But there is a real
cost in computer resources. There is a cost in computer stores. There
is a cost in customer goodwill, a cost in spain fighting, in the necessary
spam fighting tools to keep these people from trespassing upon the
personal property, the ISPs computers, that do make up the Internet.
There are legal fees. So there are very real and very big costs. This is
not just about some little old lady being mad or annoyed because she got
a porn advertisement in the mail. This is not just about the annoyance.
It is about money. It is about real money.
A significant portion of whatever you all pay for your ISP or your
monthly rate goes straight to fighting spam. If I could snap my fingers
and make all spam go away, your cost of using the Internet would go
down dramatically.
Let's talk specifically about the Internet as a place; the Internet as a
thing. What is the Internet? What if you cannot show injury in a spam
case? I am here to tell you that is a red herring. There is always by
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definition going to be injury in a spain case. Those very categories that
we just talked about. It is important here to make a distinction. Is the
Internet real property? Is it a place? What is it? People tend to lump
together the virtual property and the things that really are real. A
computer and a server and related equipment, those are real things.
Nobody can deny that those are chattels. Do not get caught up in the
analogy or rolled up into one ball of the red dragon that your character
Quasar just paid 500 quid for in your favorite on-line game, which is a
separate topic for a separate seminar. But there are booming virtual
economies. So you know, do not get lured down that slippery slope of
the Internet is all about virtual property. That is where the analogy
breaks down. It cannot be real property. Look at the things that are
selling in this game or that game. We are not talking about virtual
property or a pretend thing. We are talking about computers and
equipment that are just as solid as this podium and just as real. You
know, not the invisible robots. And this is all good-natured, by the way,
just so you all know.
MS. GRANICK: I did not come up with the invisible robots, that was
Judge Whyte.
MR. WELLBORN: Oh, I know. I know. I understand that.
MS. GRANICK: Though I do think they would be cool.
MR. WELLBORN: They would be cool. They would probably cause
less damage than these spammers do. I liked your analogy. I had never
heard the analogy about the pet dog. I liked that a lot.
But let's talk for a second about the need for real damage. I would say
that one unsolicited commercial e-mail coming into your system is
damage. Is it a small damage? Is the degradation of performance of
your system so small that you might not even notice? Yeah. It is still
there. There is damage, period. But let's step back and look at this in
terms of petting the dog versus kicking the dog.
Let's change the analogy just a little bit. Suppose you park your car
in the same parking lot every day, and there is a fellow who comes up
the moment that you park your car, and he sits there and throws BB's
as hard as he can at your car windows the whole time while you're gone,
okay. But it does not hurt your car. The one BB, it just bounces right
off. So under the theory of no damage, you cannot stop him. You would
be powerless to stop this fellow from tossing BB's at your window the
whole day.
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Now once word gets out that you have no way to stop this one fellow,
all of his hundreds of friends come and they start tossing BB's. Now
what is going to happen? Maybe one BB does not break your window,
but when a hundred hit at the same time, it pops your window. So there
has to be some exception or some recognition of the fact that, even if the
work of one spammer does not degrade or hurt your system, your real
property, your chattel, bad enough to be initially cognizable, if enough
people are doing it, then it is. And if you want to require a showing of
some kind of joint tortfeasor theory, I say, fantastic, because that means
every single spammer will be on the line for the sum total of the damage
from spain suffered by an ISP. That means that instead of getting
fifteen to twenty-five million dollar judgments against these illegal
spammers for Earthlink, we will be getting billion dollar judgments
against the spammers. So, if the spammer defenders want to go down
that road, that is fantastic, but I think because spam is innately harmful
to the system that that is an analogy that just will not fly.
One of the most important contexts that we look at the Internet and
the idea of servers and computers and things right now is the statutory
framework. What is going to happen with the federal bill? And to me
that is one of the most fascinating aspects of spam. You all might not
have seen that the Burns-Wyden Act 23 just passed the Senate. They
call it the "Canned Spain" Act. I call it the "I Can Spam" Act. That bill
possibly and other bills that are proposed definitely are actually prospam bills that have been disguised as anti-spam bills. There is no
argument right now. Spam is illegal. Every single case that has
involved an ISP suing a spammer, the ISPs won. In every one I have
seen, the ISP has won suing the person that actually sent the mail. The
ISP wins and the two causes of action that are always mentioned and
that always carry the day, among others, are the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act24 and common law trespass.
And if you think about it, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act is a
criminal statute that has one of those provisions that says, there is a
civil cause of action under this law as well. The only difference between
a civil action under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and a criminal
prosecution would be the burden of proof, that limbo land. I call it the
O.J. land, between a preponderance of the evidence and beyond
reasonable doubt. Well, these ISPs are not winning the spamming cases
in that limbo land. It is a slam dunk. I mean, 99.999 percent of the
battle in a case against a spammer is finding them because it has been
a game of technology one upsmanship and craftiness one upsmanship.

23.
24.

Burns-Wyden Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (2003).
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2003).
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What used to be as simple as knowing how to speak spammer, which
means that the word suite, like in "150 Main Street, Suite 27," means,
"Hey, Ma, I've got a box at Mailboxes, Etc." You know that you look up
"Maiboxes, Etc." on 0ht uILernet, and you send a subpoena to them and,
boom, you have the spammer's name, and you have a copy of his driver's
license. You know, case over.
They have gotten so much more sophisticated now, it is really, really
difficult to track where the spare is coming from. But once you know
who it is from and once you locate that person, it becomes a slam dunk
for the ISPs, no matter how diligently the case is lawyered and how
lawyered up the spammer tries to get on the case, it is just no win. It
is not even a defensible practice by any means.
But Burns-Wyden is kind of hazy; it's a little bit gray. Some of the
bills are even more blatant about how they are trying to do it. They
purport to preempt all of the causes of action that relate to spam. And
think about it, spam is already illegal. What most of these bills say is,
"Hey, spare is illegal except for spam that has a real street address and
has a working reply field," and, you know, whatever laundry list of
characteristics they want to include in that particular bill. There's like
I think over a dozen right now at the federal level.
If that federal bill, if the federal law preempts a common law trespass
claim, a Computer Fraud and Abuse claim, if that is the only game in
town when it comes to suing the spammers, what they have just done is
not tighten the noose, they have loosened the noose. They have made a
huge category of spam that was until then illegal now legal. And if such
a law ends up in, if such a bill ends up being signed into law, I think it
is going to be just a race before either the law is repealed because e-mail
as we know it is completely shut down by the glut of spam, or somebody
makes a convincing argument that that is an unconstitutional taking,
that you are depriving the ISPs of their right to dictate the traffic on
their computer service. So that is really to me one of the most important
ongoing issues that we have.
I get asked time and time and time again, you know, would not a law
be a great thing, and my answer is, you know, it is one more bullet in
a gun that is already loaded. Spamming is already illegal. I don't think
a Federal law will any more cut down on spamming than if Georgia
passed a law that said it is illegal to shoot somebody who is wearing a
red shirt. Well, it is already illegal. Somebody who is going to break
that law is going to break this new law, too. So I do not think that a
law, a federal law or a state spam-specific law would have a great effect
on deterring spam in and of itself.
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AUDIENCE: I am just curious. When I receive spam, I delete it
without even reading it. When I see the re- line, delete, delete, delete,
and we all go through that. I am assuming that spammers make money
and that is why they do this. But how?
MR. WELLBORN: That is a great question. That is the best softball
question I have ever seen. The reason that spammers can make money
are hit rates. From my cases, one hit rate was one per hundred, ten emails, thirty sales, one in three hundred thousand. And that was high.
This was the herbal-Viagra-type spain. So you know, that was a pretty
high hit rate for those. How can a spammer making $10 per sale getting
one sale for 300,000 e-mails, how is it worthwhile? And the way it is
worthwhile is that spam, by definition, transfers the cost to the
recipient.
The best analogy, sparn is a C.O.D. package that you and your ISP are
forced to accept. Spam is a collect call that you are forced to accept and
pay for. So that is how, the spammers do not pay. Once they get online,
if we had a $100 e-mail list and we have got the computer at home, and
it takes about an $800 computer, and about a $200 bulk e-mail software,
my eight-year-old could pop out a million e-mails a day. I mean you do
not have to be a rocket scientist. That is what is so scary about this.
You can measure society and technology in one way by thinking about
how much harm can one person do? If you go back a thousand years,
you know, that is how many arrows are in his quiver and how strong is
his bow really. Then go back a couple of hundred years. Well, it is how
many pieces of dynamite he can have in his saddlebags. But with
technology now, this is not just Internet, this is all kinds of technology,
but the Internet is a good example. With the Internet, one person can
open flood gates on a dam and flood a city, shut down an air traffic
control system, wreak havoc with the stock market, and put a country
into a depression. The harm that one person can do is immense.
And it is the same thing we see with spamming. You do not have to
be a criminal genius to spare today. You do not have to be a genius at
all. There are idiots out there who are spamming away. That is mostly
who I sue because there are so many out there that the ISPs have to
pick and choose who they go after. And by definition, if you are stupid
enough to be on the top three or four of any given ISP's hit list, then you
are too stupid to have any money and probably too stupid not to be in
jail.
And actually that gets me to the last point, the criminal aspect. I
want to stress, going back to what I was saying about the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act. That is a criminal statute and the prosecutions
under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act are now being won in that
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limbo land between the burdens of proof. So what I would like to see,
and we have seen recently, the last two spammers that Earthlink has
sued, one trial starts in two weeks and the other was sentenced last
week in relation to a spain related scheme. Both those cases also
involved identify theft and credit card fraud.
What I would like to see is some ambitious prosecutor, D.A., solicitor,
U.S. Attorney, whatever, go after someone just for spamming. I would
like to see one of them understand that if a spammer sends a billion emails a year, right out of the gates, he has cost the ISP a million dollars
for delivery, plus the goodwill, plus all the other aspects of damages that
we have talked about.
I am sure you want rebuttal, so we will save time for that. Are there
any questions?
MS. GRANICK: I will just say I disagree.
MR. WELLBORN: Thank you.
PROFESSOR MILANI: I will ask a couple of questions before we open
it up to the audience. First to you, Jennifer. I guess, I am going to use
an analogy here, a metaphor.
MS. GRANICK Beware.
PROFESSOR MILANI: Beware. Spam to me is comparable to junk
mail. I think that is a fair analogy. And I do the same thing with junk
mail that I do with spam. It is usually just pitched. And it costs me
about the same amount of time to do it. The difference that I see
between junk mail or, what is the politically correct term for it, direct
marketing, is that the person who sends the direct marketing campaign
to me pays for it. I mean they have paid the postal service, some vastly
reduced amount unquestionably, but they have paid for it, and the
spammer does not pay for it. The ISP pays for it. I think that is a
distinction that it seems to me is important in terms of the idea of what
we are trying to do here: Protect communications directly from one
person to the other person. I think that if you are shifting the costs to
the sender and not paying for it that makes a difference.
MS. GRANICK: I think that it does make a difference and explains
the popularity of spam and why companies can afford to go on a ratio of
one hit for every 300,000. I think certainly you have to keep in mind
that that one person who purchased that herbal Viagra could very well
have wanted to receive that spam. Commercial speech is still speech,
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and it does have social value. The problem is this shifting of the cost
burden to the recipient and to the ISP. There are solutions other than
to allow ISPs to decide what e-mails we get. One of those solutions is
micropayments. The Internet enables micropayments so that we can set
up a system whereby if I do not receive spam, I can charge people to
send me e-mails, and if you are not on my list of people, I can say to you,
"You need to pay me a penny or you know, half a penny or some
percentage of a penny," and that shifts the burden back to spammers.
It puts the power to decide in my hands and allows me to make the
decision, not the ISP to make those decisions for me.
One thing we have to realize is that ISPs do not have an exclusive
right to dictate what e-mails come through their server, nor do I think
they should. And second, commercial e-mail is not per se illegal. Every
single spare case that has been decided is based, not on the contents of
the spain and not purely on the ISP's decision not to receive that spam,
but on the volume and the harm that the volume of the spam does to the
ISP's business. Now we can throw around a million dollars here and a
million dollars there. I do not know how they come up with these
numbers and calculate them, but there certainly is some cost associated
both to the ISP and to us as the unwilling recipients, and a micropayment scheme can really shift that burden back onto the direct
marketing people. And I am sure that the direct marketing people hate
that idea, but I feel it is the best way to keep the seat of power and
control in the people who deserve to decide what e-mail they read, which
is us, the recipients.
PROFESSOR MILANI: Okay. Thank you. Let me ask one quick
question of Pete, and that is about the ISPs bearing the costs. An
earlier presentation was about a statute known as the ADA, and part of
the idea behind the ADA was that companies would have to bear the
costs of providing reasonable accommodations to employees with
disabilities or to people who came in to use their services, for example,
providing interpreters for the deaf. What is the problem with having the
ISPs bear some of the costs here in the same way that we ask companies
to bear the costs of providing accommodations to employees with
disabilities?
MR. WELLBORN: First off, it is not even apples to oranges, it is,
apples to spaceships to compare enabling access of the handicapped to
giving criminals an unfettered right to steal resources from the computer
system. So that is my short answer.
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a contractual standpoint, as an ISP you have a sort of contract because
you make a payment to this particular company. Now contractually if
that particular company decides that they want to cut out all the spam
or dictate what goes through their particular portal, you know, it is a
free society. You can switch from one ISP to another ISP. So where
does the freedom of speech versus the contract issues get involved?
MR. WELLBORN: You all, I promise I did not plant him in the
audience. That is a fantastic point, and in fact that is right. That is
entirely consistent with the idea that the ISP's computers and servers
and property are not governmental, they are not utilities, they are not
pseudo governmental, they are not pseudo utilities, they are private
property. And in fact, the Internet would already be virtually unusable,
but all ISPs do something called blocking at the gateway, which means
that there are some e-mails that come into the system and based upon
how the individual users have their filters set up, it may or may not get
to the user, and that is within the user's hands. There are billions of emails a day that are blocked at the gateway before they get in the door
to be filtered because they are coming from an IP block of a known
spammer or because for whatever reason they are not routed. They are
not even admitted. And if an ISP did not engage in some sort of
blocking at the gateway, I guess the end result would be that your
monthly cost is going to go up, you know, thirty percent, forty percent,
fifty percent, as the ISPs would have to get a whole lot more equipment
to deal with these people that are trying to steal their computer
resources.
AUDIENCE: What does Jennifer have to say about that?
MS. GRANICK: I am making a distinction between use which harms
the computer server and use which does not harm the computer server
but which has some other sort of cost that the business does not like.
The thing to remember here is that there are certainly property interests
but there are public interests at stake as well. And even in the property
context we use other kinds of legal doctrines to balance public interest
and private interest. Rather than, for example, giving the ISPs the
absolute right to exclude any e-mail traffic they do not want and the
harm that comes from that, and I can give you some examples.
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One example is Mr. Hamidi who is prevented from communicating his
message about Intel's employment practices directly to the people to
whom it matters most. Another example is a case that I had where my
client sent e-mail to the employee, or rather to the customers of his
former employer, telling them that the former employer's Web mail
service was insecure and they should be careful because other people
could read their e-mails. These are cases in which if the ISP had their
way and could block these communications, none of this information
would get through. And if my ISP decided they do not support this
political candidate and they support that one, they could say, "I'm sorry,
but this candidate can't send our customers e-mail, and that is a tragic
social cost."
So instead of saying that we are going to give ISPs the absolute right
to exclude, an unprecedented and completely new property right, we
could use a theory like nuisance, which is a theory we use with real
property, where you balance. You balance the rights of the computer
owners with the public interest and the rights of the people to receive emails over that system. Think about it just for a minute, ladies and
gentlemen, of what the Internet would look like if your ISP can tell you
what you could send, who you could talk to, what programs you could
run. That would not be the Internet, that would be TV. And when you
talk about suing people for unwanted content, I personally nominate the
WB Network. FOX gets a pass from me because of "The Simpsons."
PROFESSOR MILANI: We have several other questions.
MR. WELLBORN: Let me just say one thing real quick. I want to
make it clear that, first off, it is to me a Big Brother argument to talk
about ISPs filtering content-based e-mails, and you end up with an
Orwellian type scenario. That is just not happening. The Hamidi case,
really we do not even need to talk about it. It should not even be
mentioned here. That is not a spam case.
I was very careful to define spam as unsolicited commercial e-mail.
Commercial speech, commercial e-mails, are afforded the least protection
under the First Amendment. My position would be: I may still to
defend the right to do it, but it would be an entirely different conversation. Talking about filtering one political candidate's promotional emails. That flunks the stupid test, too, though because candidates who
sparn end up being hated for their spam. But anyway, Hamidi was more
akin to a consumer comment type case. I mean by analogy, look at
trademark law. There is a huge difference. If I set up a "University of
Georgia" sucks website, which, you know, I went to Georgia Tech so I
can say that. I grew up hating the Dawgs. I am just teasing, of course.
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sucks" website that would be an entirely different situation than if I set
up a University of Alaska official merchandise, officially merchandised
logo, officially whatever logo endorsed merchandise, you know, selling
University of Alaska T-shirts and other things that I am representing
were approved by the University of Alaska. They are both use of the
University of Alaska name but they are in an entirely different context,
and that is the same thing here with Hamidi's consumer comment if you
break it down to its truest essence. Spamming is an attempt to steal
computer resources for the criminal's financial gain.
PROFESSOR MILANI: Another question?
AUDIENCE: Just a little political reality here. Why is it taking so
long for Congress to act on anti-spamming legislation? I know there are
some state laws and there are some constitutional issues.
MR. WELLBORN: Three letters, D-M-A, the Direct Marketing
Association who has an incredibly powerful lobby, whose efforts have
prevented the passage of any bill in the past and even more egregiously
have resulted in a number of the "wolves in sheep's clothing" bills that
we see now which are actually pro-spam bills disguised as anti-spam
bills.
PROFESSOR MILANI: In the back there were several questions.
MR. WELLBORN: Jennifer, do you MS. GRANICK: No, I agree.
MR. WELLBORN: Oh, we agree on something.
PROFESSOR MILANI: Go ahead.
AUDIENCE: If the costs are associated to the ISPs, how come they
have not developed a system, assuming most of these spammers use
ISPs, that can limit them. Apparently these spammers are paying their
monthly fees. How many e-mails go out, like 500 per (inaudible), or is
the ISP masking such a problem that they can't tell?
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MR. WELLBORN: The ISP masking is a problem, and it has been a
game of technological one upsmanship from day one. It is a rare, rare,
rare situation now where you will see a spammer spamming from a paid
account with a major ISP. What they are doing now is either, you know,
just as some for instances, they will have their spamvertize, the
advertising spain website, hosted overseas. They may send their mails
out from an overseas service that then routes them through the
misconfigured mail server of some random company that has their
computer set up wrong so the mail is going to be coming from that
company. The newest thing, and this is within the past few weeks, the
spammers claim that they now have a service or product by which they
can host their websites anywhere they want to, even on an Earthlink or
an AOL or whatever, and this product makes it impossible to determine
from the domain name what the IP address is. The thing that blows my
mind is that if some of these spammers had put their minds to good use,
as opposed to figuring a way to beat the system, they could have been
millionaires many times over instead of petty criminals.
PROFESSOR MILANI: Nancy Terrill in the back.
MS. TERRILL: You mentioned the costs to the ISP, but you were also
talking about the cost to the consumer. If we get rid of spam, then
basically the cost of our Internet service would go down, our monthly fee.
Has there been consumer class action? Would that be possible assuming
you could locate the spammer for costs, stealing because they are not
just stealing from the ISP, they are stealing from me, and I am having
to pay?
MS. GRANICK: The ISP is going to lower our monthly rate, yeah.
MS. TERRILL: According to Pete they are.
MR. WELLBORN: Most ISPs will tell you right now that they are not
passing the costs of spare fighting on. It is a free market. I have got to
think if spam went away and all of the profit margins of the ISPs were
quadrupled, you would have ISPs dropping their costs to try and get
more business. You know, it is just free enterprise. That is a great idea
I think. You may even have a third party beneficiary type of, contract
type of claim under the policies of the ISP, where it is the user who is
protected. By stealing the computer resources, there is always the
argument in these spare cases that the spammer is bound by the terms
of service, the company posted terms of service, that governs anyone's
use of those computers, user or not, of that particular ISP.
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PROFESSOR MILANI: Professor Oedel.
PROFESSOR OEDEL: Pete, I was interested in hearing your
eoiuieuiti about Jennifer's proposal about a nuisance theory being
possibly valid in this context. Have you used it in some of your cases?
Does it have the benefit of being a more balanced, nuanced test that
might be able to accommodate, for instance, the First Amendment kind
of concerns?
MR. WELLBORN: First off, I think it would be very difficult to draw
the line. You know, when does no damage become damage. If costing
the ISP a dollar because a hundred e-mails were delivered is not
damage, you know, is a thousand damage, is ten thousand damage? I
think there is a great difficulty there in trying to draw some artificial
line when, in fact, the courts should recognize that any e-mails are
damage. As a practical matter, I have not seen that much because there
are so many spammers out there, like I said before, that the ISPs by
definition are going after the people that are stupid enough and prolific
enough to be up at the top of the hit list for the ISPs. So by definition
the spammers that are being sued are the ones who are popping out a
billion a year.
What I would like to see happen is some of the ISPs go after the
quote, "legitimate" spammers, and by that I put legitimate in quotes and
understand that it's said sarcastically. These are the spammers who
may have a valid reply e-mail address, they may have a real store on the
street, and they may be selling real things. But despite the fact that
their e-mail does not also involve the aggravating layers of credit card
fraud or fraud in the sale or identity theft or what-not, the spam of those
legitimate businesses is nonetheless illegal, is just as actionable. I think
some cases against those types of spammers would send a message to
any other people out there who were somehow operating under the
misperception that spamming is legal. What I think a lot of spammers
out there are doing, at least the non-career spammers think, "Yeah, I
know it is wrong, and, yeah, I know it is illegal but it is akin to
jaywalking." We all know jaywalking is illegal, but everybody jaywalks
because, in your mind, it is just not that big a deal. You know it is
illegal, but it is not that big a deal. And I think there is a subset of
spammers that function in that world, that, "Yeah, I know it is wrong;
yeah, I know it is against the law, but it is not a big deal." If some of
those people were given the financial death penalty in civil cases and
that was publicized, that would cause the other jaywalker spammers to
think twice.
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MS. GRANICK: Even if we ignore the problems of defining commercial speech versus political speech, the proposition that any unsolicited
commercial speech is per se illegal, regardless of any kind of requirements of the server, has immense First Amendment problems.
PROFESSOR MILANI: Question here.
AUDIENCE: I have a question. In recent months there's been, you
know, great controversy about the national "do not call" list, and I guess
my question is two-part. First of all, do you perceive a do not e-mail list
in the future as far as personal e-mail accounts go. And, secondly, if the
two situations can be analogized, would a judicial ruling in favor of the
marketers, telemarketers, would that be something the spammers, these
people who send out unsolicited e-mail, could use as an argument for
their side?
MS. GRANICK: Definitely. There are very similar issues between a
telemarketer "do not call" list and an anti-spammer "do not e-mail" list.
But I think that one of the big obstacles to developing a do not spam list,
which I think is one of the proposals that's on the floor of the Congress
right now, is the security issue. As a direct marketer wouldn't you just
love that list? I mean when you talk about getting together a great list
of e-mails to target people. So I think, you know, one of the great
concerns is having this list. If somebody stole that list then that would
be out there and that would be really bad. But you could then have
some kind of penalty system where you have at least an expressed
statement for people who have signed up for the list saying I do not
want to receive these e-mails and if you do send me e-mails then you can
seek civil or criminal penalties. And I am much more comfortable with
that because that puts the power again in the hands of the consumers
to say what kind of messages they would and would not like to receive.
I think that we will move toward something like that or toward maybe
even labeling to enable user filtering.
PROFESSORMILANI: I am going to let Pete respond and then we
are going to have to end. I am sorry.
MR. WELLBORN: Okay. Real quick. Two points. First off, the
telemarketing law, to compare that to spam, I think the analogy breaks
down a little bit because with telemarketing there is going to be a person
at the other end of the line when they call you. Otherwise it already
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violates the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 25 The other provisions
of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act really give a better analogy
to a spare law, and that is the junk fax laws. It is against the law to
end umm
u faxes. why? I mean, yes, it is just electrons. Yes you
know, commercial speech still has some minute degree of protection
under the First Amendment. But as with spamming, a junk fax totally
distributes the cost of delivery to the recipient. And it takes the
recipient's stuff. It takes his chattel. It uses up toner. It uses up
resources of the fax machine.
Secondly, for the list, I believe whole heartedly an e-mail specific do
not spam list would be idiotic if it were put out in the public domain for
spammers to follow the law and not spain these people. There has been
technology where the proposals direct all e-mails will go through this
and it will be blind filtering. That would be horrendous as well. If there
is going to be a list, what I propose and what I think is a good idea is
don't make it e-mail specific, make it domain specific. And by that I
mean you can already get a list of pretty much every domain that is out
there, so that is not giving away any state secrets. Instead of all forty
million AOL users or fifty million AOL users having to each put their
five addresses on the list and have those out there for the whole world
to see, let's just let AOL say no spain to anybody at AOL.com. Remember, spain is unsolicited commercial e-mail. And I am sure that if some
ISP wants to garner the business of the nine people in the country who
like spain, they will not put their domain on the list. By doing that you
could not give away any privacy. I bet you if we did that the top ten
domains or top twenty domains on that list would probably cover ninety
percent of the e-mail addresses in the country so it would be very
efficient and one good way of stopping at least the ethical spammers, if
there is such a thing, from continuing.
PROFESSOR MILANI: Thank you. Pete just solved the problem.

25.

Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2003).

*

*

*

